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Reasonable Accommodation for Employees with Perceived Disabilities:   
An Alternative Approach Based on Relationship 
 
Wilson G. Barmeyer* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Does the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA) require “reasonable 
accommodation” for employees who are “regarded as” disabled, or is reasonable accommodation 
only required for employees who are “actually disabled?”  There is a growing debate over 
whether and to what extent employees with “perceived disabilities” should be entitled to the 
same reasonable accommodation rights as employees with “actual disabilities.”  Of the ten 
circuits that have considered the issue, four have held that employees with perceived disabilities 
are entitled to reasonable accommodation;1 four have held otherwise;2 and two have considered 
the issue but declined to address it.3  Legal scholarship on the issue is also equally divided.4 
                                                 
* University of Georgia School of Law, J.D. expected 2006.  The author expresses appreciation to Professor E. Ann 
Puckett and Dean Rebecca Hanner White of the UGA Law School for their invaluable instruction and inspiration in 
the field, and to Kristin Timm for her editorial assistance. 
1 D’Angelo v. Conagra Foods Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1240 (11th Cir. 2005); Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc., 410 F.3d 
670, 676 (10th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t., 380 F.3d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 2004); Katz v. 
City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996). 
2 Kaplan v. City of Nev. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1233 (9th Cir. 2003); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 
(8th Cir. 1999); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999); Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 
161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998). 
3 Cigan v. Chippewa Falls Sch. Dist., 388 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 2004); Cameron v. Cmty. Aid for Retarded 
Children, Inc., 335 F.3d 60, 64 (2nd Cir. 2003). 
4 Compare Timothy J. McFarlin, Comment, If They Ask for a Stool...Recognizing Reasonable Accommodation for 
Employees “Regarded As” Disabled, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 927, 929, 965 (2005) (advocating accommodation based 
on plain language, legislative history, and the interactive process requirement), with Padmaja Chivukula, Is 
Ignorance Bliss?  A Pennsylvania Employer’s Obligation to Provide Reasonable Accommodation to Employees It 
Regards as “Disabled” After Buskirk v. Apollo Metals, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 541, 544 (2003)(opposing accommodation 
rights based on legislative intent and “common sense”); Allen Dudley, Comment, Rights to Reasonable 
Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act for “Regarded As” Disabled Individuals, 7 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 389, 391 (1999)(arguing against accommodation, “because entitling persons merely ‘regarded as’ 
disabled to accommodation leads to an absurd result”).  Some scholars have argued for alternatives to the “all-or-
nothing” positions.  See Michael D. Moberly, Letting Katz Out of the Bag:  The Employer’s Duty to Accommodate 
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 The circuit courts that have considered the issue have generally taken “all-or-nothing” 
approaches by laying down clear rules either for or against accommodation.5  Courts that follow 
an “all approach” provide the full range of statutory protections to an employee with a perceived 
disability, including the right to reasonable accommodation.6  These courts have reasoned that an 
all approach is consistent with the plain language and statutory purpose of the ADA.7  Other 
circuits have taken a “nothing approach,” which denies a cause of action to a regarded as 
disabled plaintiff who seeks reasonable accommodation in the workplace.8  These courts have 
argued that providing reasonable accommodation for perceived disabilities would give these 
employees an unfair advantage over similarly situated individuals and lead to “bizarre results” 
that are contrary to the equal opportunity goals of the ADA.9 
 This Paper argues that both categorical approaches are incorrect, because neither 
approach fully reflects the equal opportunity goals of the ADA.10  The “regarded as” prong of the 
ADA covers individuals facing a variety of impairments and stereotypes,11 and the need for and 
right to accommodation will depend on the specific facts of a given case. What is needed is not a 
categorical rule for or against accommodation, but an interpretation of the ADA that is faithful to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Perceived Disabilities, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 603, 610 (1998)(arguing that employer should be required to accommodate 
employees with actual impairments who are erroneously perceived to be disabled, but not employees who are 
regarded as disabled but have no impairment); Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the Playing Field or Stacking the Deck?  
The “Unfair Advantage” Critique of Perceived Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L. REV. 901, 906-907 (2000)(arguing that 
“the accommodations question is better framed as a remedies issue”). 
5 See supra notes 1-2 (listing cases); Travis, supra note 4, at 906-07 (describing approaches as “all-or-nothing”). 
6 See D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1235-36; Williams, 380 F.3d  at 775-76. 
7 See Williams, 380 F.3d at 774 (pointing to plain language and legislative history). 
8 See supra note 2 (creating categorical rule against accommodation). 
9 See Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916 (8th Cir. 1999)(citing “bizarre results”). 
10 See C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.9 (setting forth equal opportunity goals); Travis, supra note 4, at 906-907 
(rejecting categorical approaches). 
11 The EEOC has delineated three subcategories within the “regarded as” prong of the definition of disability.  See 
infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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the statutory language and purpose and gives courts flexibility to require or deny accommodation 
based on a factual inquiry.12 
 This Paper explores the rationales behind the all-or-nothing approaches and concludes 
that the circuit split on this issue is largely superficial, based more on factual differences between 
the cases coming before the circuits than on legal disagreement about the ADA.  The circuits 
disagree because they have different conceptualizations of the paradigmatic regarded as disabled 
plaintiff.  Those in the “nothing” camp envision an employee who is adversely affected only by a 
misperception.13  To them, remedying the misperception will provide the employee with equal 
opportunity, and therefore, entitling that employee to reasonable accommodation would be 
something extra that the ADA does not require.14  In contrast, those in the “all” camp envision an 
employee who has been adversely affected by discrimination in such a way that reasonable 
accommodation is necessary to provide that employee with equal opportunity.15  In this way, 
both positions strive for equal opportunity, but the different fact situations that have come before 
the circuits have resulted in divergent legal rules. 
 This Paper seeks to reconcile this circuit split by offering a legal interpretation of the 
ADA that reaches an appropriate result without laying down a categorical rule.  This theory 
encourages courts to focus on the relationship between the accommodation and the specific 
disability.  An employee with a perceived disability should only be entitled to accommodation 
where there is a casual connection between employer’s misperception and the denial of the 
accommodation.  That is, an employee will only have a right to an accommodation that was 
denied because of the misperception that gave rise to his statutory disability.  This alternative 
                                                 
12 See Travis, supra note 4, at 907 (also advocating for alternative approach).  
13 See id. at 1000-01 (stating that “those with perceived disabilities do not face any resulting structural or dynamic 
barriers to equal employment opportunity”). 
14 See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra note 60-61 and accompanying text (presenting hypothetical from point of view of all approach). 
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approach relies on the individualized determination required by the ADA and the flexibility 
inherent in the right to reasonable accommodation.  Because there are a variety of fact situations 
under which an individual can demonstrate a perceived disability, the relationship between that 
disability and the right to accommodation will depend on specific facts.  This gives courts 
flexibility to require reasonable accommodation only where it is consistent with the purposes of 
the ADA. 
 Part II of this Paper presents an overview of the relevant ADA background, statutory 
definitions, and EEOC regulations necessary to understand the conceptual issues.16  Parts III and 
IV continue with a discussion of the arguments that have been raised for and against reasonable 
accommodation for perceived disabilities, with Part III describing the nothing approach17 and 
Part IV summarizing the all approach.18  Part V concludes by offering a third way.  It proposes a 
relationship approach that meets the level playing field objectives of the ADA without providing 
an unfair advantage for employees with perceived disabilities.19 
 
II. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE ADA 
 The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against a “qualified individual with a 
disability” because of that individual’s disability.20  To establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff employee must show (1) that he is disabled within the 
meaning of the statute, (2) that he is qualified with or without reasonable accommodation, and 
(3) that he has suffered an adverse employment decision because of his disability.21 
                                                 
16 See infra notes 20-42 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 43-60 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 61-86 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 87-120 and accompanying text. 
20 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)(2000). 
21 See e.g., Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t., 380 F.3d 751, 761 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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A. THE DEFINITION OF DISABILITY 
 The ADA provides three alternative definitions of disability, and therefore three 
alternative ways for a plaintiff to show that he is entitled to statutory protection.  Under the 
ADA, “[t]he term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an individual, (A) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more. . .major life [activities]; (B) a record of such an 
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”22  The “regarded as” prong 
was meant to protect individuals who are perceived as disabled, even though they may not be 
actually disabled within the meaning of subsection (A).23  With this prong, Congress sought to 
protect against discrimination based on perceived disabilities, because it recognized that the 
“accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases are as handicapping as the physical 
limitations that flow from actual impairment.”24 
 The EEOC has provided additional guidance on the meaning of the regarded as prong.  
The regulations lay out three categories of individuals who are regarded as disabled: 
[Category 1] – Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially 
limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as 
constituting such limitation; 
[Category 2] – Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major 
life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such 
impairment; or 
                                                 
22 42 U.S.C.S. § 12102(2)(A)-(C)(2000) (emphasis added). 
23 See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, at 453 (discussing purpose of regarded as 
disabled prong). 
24 School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). 
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[Category 3] – Has [no impairment] but is treated by a covered entity as having a 
substantially limiting impairment.25 
The EEOC Technical Assistance Manual provides an example of each category.26  An 
example of Category 1 is an employee who has “controlled high blood pressure that is not 
substantially limiting.”27  This employee would be regarded as disabled if the employer reassigns 
him to less strenuous work “because of unsubstantiated fears that [he] will suffer a heart attack if 
he. . .continues to perform strenuous work.”28  Category 2 covers an employee who has a 
prominent facial scar that does not limit major life activities.29  “If an employer discriminates 
against such an individual because of the negative reactions of customers, the employer would be 
regarding the individual as disabled. . . .”30  Category 3 covers an employee who has no 
impairment at all but who is fired by his employer because of an unfounded rumor that he has 
HIV.31  For all three categories of perceived disabilities, it is “necessary that a covered entity 
entertain misperceptions about the individual” for the individual to be disabled under the 
regarded as prong.32 
B. QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL AND REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 
 To prevail on an ADA claim, the plaintiff must be a “qualified individual with a 
disability.”33  A qualified individual with a disability is one who, “with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such 
                                                 
25 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(l).   






32 Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 489 (U.S. 1999)(defining regarded as disabled within a two category 
framework).  
33 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)(2000)(emphasis added). 
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individual holds or desires.”34  The ADA provides that an employee with a disability is entitled 
to reasonable accommodation if such accommodation will enable the employee to perform the 
essential functions of the position.35  Discrimination under the ADA includes “not making 
reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability.”36  With the requirement of reasonable accommodation, the ADA 
goes beyond the protections of Title VII in seeking to level the playing field in the workplace for 
individuals with disabilities.37 
 Reasonable accommodation can include modifications to the job application process, 
modifications to the work environment that enable a qualified individual to perform the essential 
functions of the job, or modifications that enable the individual with a disability to enjoy equal 
benefits and privileges enjoyed by other employees.38  Accommodation can include structural 
changes to the physical work environment which make facilities accessible, or job restructuring 
such as part time schedules or reassignment to a vacant position.39  In order to determine the 
appropriate accommodation, the employer should engage in an interactive process with the 
employee to “identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential 
reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.”40  Reasonable 
                                                 
34 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)(2000). 
35 The issue is whether the employee is qualified “with or without reasonable accommodation.”  E.g., Williams v. 
Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t., 380 F.3d 751, 761 (3d Cir. 2004). 
36 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)(2000). 
37 See Travis, supra note 4, at 914 (discussing the seven types of discrimination under the ADA, and noting that all 
but the reasonable accommodation provision mirror Title VII). 
38 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1). 
39 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2). 
40 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). 
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accommodation is not required if it imposes undue hardship on the employer.41  For example, the 
ADA does not require an employer to “find or create a new job” or create a light duty position.42 
 
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ACCOMMODATION:  THE “NOTHING” APPROACH 
 The circuit split over reasonable accommodation results at least partly from a different 
conceptualization of the potential fact situations that can arise when an employee with a 
perceived disability requests accommodation.  This section begins with a hypothetical that 
illustrates the paradigm plaintiff from the point of view of the nothing approach and then 
presents the arguments against requiring accommodation for perceived disabilities. 
A. THE PARADIGM PLAINTIFF AS ENVISIONED BY THE “NOTHING” APPROACH 
 The employer, a supermarket, requires all cashiers to stand.43  Two cashiers, Employee A 
and Employee B, have back problems that cause discomfort and prevent them from standing for 
long periods of time, but these impairments are not substantially limiting enough to amount to 
actual disabilities.  The employer fires Employee A because she cannot stand for an entire shift.  
Employee B’s impairment, however, is incorrectly perceived by the employer as being more 
severe, thus constituting an actual disability and entitling her to ADA protection.  As a result, the 
employer offers her a stool as accommodation and allows her to continue working as a seated 
cashier.  Even though Employees A and B are objectively similar, requiring reasonable 
accommodation solely because of the employer’s incorrect misperception gives Employee B an 
advantage over Employee A.44 
                                                 
41 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)(2000). 
42 See e.g., Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 809 (5th Cir. 1997); Chairi v. City of League City, 
920 F.2d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 1991). 
43 This hypothetical, and the one presented in Part IV, is adapted from a hypothetical described by the Third Circuit 
in Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t., 380 F.3d 751, 776 n.19 (3d Cir. 2004). 
44 See Travis, supra note 4, at 919-20 (presenting hypothetical of hospital workers that leads to similar results). 
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B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ACCOMMODATION 
 1. The Title VII Analogy.  “Regarded as” disabled individuals are often compared to 
victims of race or sex discrimination.  According to Judge Richard Posner, “Such people, 
objectively capable of performing as well as the unimpaired, are analogous to capable workers 
discriminated against because of their skin color or some other vocationally irrelevant 
characteristic.”45  Because these individuals are merely regarded as disabled and not actually 
disabled, reasonable accommodation is not necessary to “level the playing field” for these 
employees.46  Because their impairments are “nondisabling,” they should be entitled to equal 
treatment, but nothing more, analogous to the rights of plaintiffs who sue for discrimination 
under Title VII.  Opponents of reasonable accommodation for perceived disabilities argue that 
accommodation is not necessary to achieve the equal opportunity goals of the ADA.47 
 2. The “Unfair Advantage” Critique.48  The unfair advantage theory reasons that 
providing accommodation for individuals who are merely regarded as disabled would give them 
a “windfall” by treating them more favorably than similarly situated individuals.49  As the Eighth 
Circuit stated in Weber v. Strippit, Inc., accommodation would “create a disparity in treatment 
among impaired but non-disabled employees, denying most the right to reasonable 
accommodations but granting to others, because of their employers’ misperceptions, a right to 
reasonable accommodations no more limited than those afforded actually disabled employees.”50  
Requiring reasonable accommodation would therefore exceed the ADA’s level playing field goal 
                                                 
45 Vande Zande v. Wisc. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 541 (7th Cir. 1995). 
46 See Travis, supra note 4, at 963. 
47 See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. 
48 See Travis, supra note 4, at 901 (referring to this argument as “unfair advantage critique”). 
49 Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999). 
50 Id. 
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and “stack the deck” for perceived disability plaintiffs over other nondisabled individuals and 
those who are actually disabled.51 
The Weber court noted that “imposing liability on employers who fail to accommodate 
non-disabled employees who are simply regarded as disabled would lead to bizarre results.”52  
First, as discussed, accommodation would create a windfall for regarded as disabled 
employees.53  Second, such a rule would “do nothing to encourage...employees to educate 
employers of their capabilities.”54    Third, as noted by the Third Circuit in Deane v. Pocono 
Medical Center, after litigation disabuses the employer of the misperception that gave rise to the 
employee’s regarded as disability, the employee would no longer be disabled under the ADA, 
and the employer would be free to fire the employee without providing accommodation.55  In this 
situation, a right to accommodation would be “bizarre” because it would provide no lasting 
remedy.56  Under this logic, the ADA should not require physical accommodation for 
impairments that are not actually disabling. 
3. Gaming the Process.  In Deane, the Third Circuit stated that giving a right to 
reasonable accommodation would “permit healthy employees to, through litigation (or the threat 
of litigation) demand changes in their work environments under the guise of ‘reasonable 
accommodations’ for disabilities based upon misperceptions.”57  This is not a persuasive 
rationale for denying accommodation.  Such conduct by an employee would be foreclosed by the 
ADA’s requirement of an interactive process to identify an individual’s limitations and 
                                                 
51 Travis, supra note 4, at 906. 
52 Weber, 186 F.3d at 916. 
53 Id. (quoting Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 149 n.12 (3d. Cir. 1998)). 
54 Id. at 917. 
55 Deane, 142 F.3d at 148-149 n.12. 
56 Id.  See also Dudley, supra note 4, at 414-15 (discussing this “odd result”). 
57 Deane, 142 F.3d at 148-149 n.12; Weber, 186 F.3d at 917. 
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appropriate accommodations.58  In the interactive process, “both the employer and the employee 
have a duty to assist in the search for appropriate reasonable accommodation and to act in good 
faith.”59  An employee who acted in bad faith, therefore, would no longer have a right to 
reasonable accommodation.60 
 
IV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF ACCOMMODATION:  THE “ALL” APPROACH 
 The Title VII analogy and the windfall argument are both persuasive arguments against 
reasonable accommodation for perceived disabilities in the context of a fact situation similar to 
the hypothetical introduced in Part III.  These arguments, however, are inapplicable to other fact 
situations that can arise under the regarded as prong.  This section begins with a hypothetical 
describing such a situation and then discusses the common arguments in favor of 
accommodation, including adherence to the statutory language and purpose of the ADA. 
A. THE PARADIGM PLAINTIFF AS ENVISIONED BY THE “ALL” APPROACH 
 Like the earlier hypothetical, the employer is a supermarket that requires all cashiers to 
stand.  Once again, two cashiers, Employee C and Employee D, have back problems that cause 
discomfort and prevent them from standing for long periods of time, but these impairments are 
not substantially limiting enough to amount to actual disabilities.  Both employees are reliable 
workers and the employer would like to retain both of them if possible.  The employer accurately 
perceives Employee C’s impairment, and voluntarily chooses to make a simple and low cost 
accommodation.   The employer provides Employee C with a stool to sit on while her line is 
clear, but still requires her to stand while checking out customers.  This accommodation by the 
                                                 
58 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). 
59 Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t., 380 F.3d 751, 771 (3d Cir. 2004)(emphasis added). 
60 See also MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, AND REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 756 (6th ed. 2003)(“An employee who fails to participate in discussions about 
accommodation may forfeit protection against disability discrimination.”). 
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employer enables Employee C to succeed in her position, to the benefit of both the employee and 
the employer.  The employer makes this minor accommodation, not because it is required by the 
ADA, but because the employer has an interest in retaining a reliable employee.   
 Meanwhile, the supermarket misperceives Employee D’s back impairment as one that 
prevents her from standing for more than a few minutes at a time, and fires her because she 
cannot stand.  In contrast to the hypothetical in Part III, in this situation Employee D is not given 
an advantage because she is “regarded as” disabled.  To the contrary, she is treated less favorably 
than a coworker with an objectively similar limitation.  “The employee whose limitations [were] 
perceived accurately gets to work, while [the misperceived employee was] sent home unpaid.”61 
B. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF ACCOMMODATION 
1. The Plain Language of the ADA.  A plain language reading of the ADA suggests that 
all individuals who are disabled within the meaning of the statute are entitled to reasonable 
accommodation.  The statute contains three separate definitions of disability, and the statute’s 
prohibition on discrimination applies equally to all three statutorily defined disabilities.62  Both 
the Eleventh Circuit and the Third Circuit have noted that “[t]he text of this statute simply offers 
no basis for differentiating among the three types of disabilities in determining which are entitled 
to a reasonable accommodation and which are not.”63  Although Professor Michelle Travis has 
                                                 
61 Williams, 380 F.3d at 775. 
62 D’Angelo v. Conagra Foods Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235-1236 (11th Cir. 2005). 
63 Id. at 1236, 1238 (“[C]ourts are not authorized to rewrite a statute because they might deem its effects susceptible 
of improvement.”); Williams, 380 F.3d at 774 (stating that “the statutory text of the ADA does not in any way 
‘distinguish between [actually] disabled and ‘regarded as’ individuals in requiring accommodation.’”)(quoting 
Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 196 (3d. Cir. 1999)). 
13 
argued that this reading of the ADA is overly mechanical,64 even circuits adopting the nothing 
approach have acknowledged that the plain language favors accommodation.65 
2. Legislative History and Purpose.  The legislative history and purpose of the ADA 
support the plain language meaning.66  Congress, through the regarded as prong, recognized that 
“discriminatory attitudes and actions can create tangible limitations.”67  In the legislative history, 
Congress adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. 
Arline,68 stating that the “accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases are as 
handicapping as the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.”69  By providing 
protection to individuals with perceived disabilities, Congress sought to eliminate discrimination 
based on “stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such 
individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.”70  Courts in favor of accommodation 
have viewed this legislative history as evidence of congressional intent to provide the full range 
of statutory protections to individuals who are regarded as disabled.71 
3. Supreme Court Precedent.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Arline offers precedent 
for accommodation of individuals with perceived disabilities.72  In Arline, a school teacher with 
                                                 
64 See Travis, supra note 4, at 935-36 (arguing that statutory language is “far more ambiguous,” because it “does not 
indicate whether an employer must accommodate any performance limitation of a protected employee or only those 
limitations that are caused by the disability itself”). 
65 See Kaplan v. City of Nev. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003)(noting that “on its face,” ADA “does 
not differentiate”). 
66 See Williams, 380 F.3d at 774 (pointing to legislative history in holding that “Congress meant what its text says”). 
67 McFarlin, supra note 4, at 943. 
68 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
69 H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (III), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453 (citing Arline). 
70 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(7)(2000). 
71 D’Angelo v. Conagra Foods Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1237 (11th Cir. 2005); Williams, 380 F.3d at 774.  But see 
Travis, supra note 4, at 955-56 (arguing that accommodation that provides unfair advantage is inconsistent with 
legislative purpose of securing equal opportunity); Dudley, supra note 4, at 410 (stating that legislative history does 
not support this creation of an “overinclusive class”). 
72 Arline, 480 U.S. at 288-89.  See also McFarlin, supra note 4, at 959 (explaining precedent argument for 
accommodation). 
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tuberculosis was fired because of fears of contagiousness.73  The Supreme Court held she was 
entitled to protection under the “record of” disability prong.74  In dicta, the Court also discussed 
the regarded as prong and remanded for a determination not only of whether she was contagious, 
but also “whether the school board could have reasonably accommodated her.”75  While this is 
not controlling precedent of the Court, the decision lends precedential value to the position that 
accommodation should be available for perceived disabilities. 
4. The “Mischief Rule.”  The mischief rule focuses on the employer’s conduct.  To the 
extent that the ADA is designed to punish and deter discrimination, an employer who fails to 
reasonably accommodate an individual who it regards as disabled is just as culpable as the 
employer who fails to accommodate an individual who is actually disabled.76  The employer’s 
discriminatory intent is equally invidious, because at the time of the adverse employment action, 
the employer has no basis for distinguishing between an actual disability and a perceived 
disability.77  Denying accommodation for perceived disabilities would therefore conflict with the 
ADA’s deterrence rationale.78 
 Employer culpability for discrimination on the basis of perceived disabilities relates to 
the ADA’s requirement of an interactive process.  The ADA requires that an employer engage in 
an interactive process with an employee to identify that individual’s precise limitations.79  This 
places a duty of good faith on the employer not to have misperceptions about an employee’s 
impairment.80  If an employer has misperceptions about an employee because of a failure to 
                                                 
73 Arline, 480 U.S. at 276. 
74 Id. at 285-86. 
75 Id. at 288-89. 
76 See Travis, supra note 4, at 994 (focusing on employer conduct). 
77 Id. 
78 See Moberly, supra note 4, at 640 (elaborating on deterrence goals of the ADA). 
79 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o)(3). 
80 Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t., 380 F.3d 751, 771 (3d Cir. 2004)(describing employer’s duty of 
good faith). 
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engage in an interactive process, then that employer is culpable of the stereotyping that the ADA 
was designed to prevent.81  If the employer engages in the interactive process and learns that an 
employee is not actually disabled, then accommodation is not be required.82  This reasoning 
lends further support to the arguments in favor of accommodation when an employer regards an 
employee as disabled because of a failure to engage in the interactive process. 
5. Regarded as individuals are not “similarly situated.”  In D’Angelo v. Conagra Foods 
Inc., the Eleventh Circuit responded to the windfall proposition by arguing that regarded as 
plaintiffs are not “similarly situated” with employees with objectively similar impairments.83  
First, regarded as plaintiffs are not “impaired but non-disabled;” instead they are “disabled 
within the meaning of the statute.”84  Second, an employee who is impaired and regarded as 
disabled is not similarly situated with an employee who is merely impaired, because the 
“‘regarded as’ disabled employee is subject to the stigma of the disabling and discriminatory 
attitudes of others.”85  For example, in the hypothetical above, “[t]he employee whose limitations 
are perceived accurately gets to work, while [the plaintiff] is sent home unpaid.”86   
This argument reinforces the importance of the interactive process.  An effective 
interactive process will remedy misperceptions.  Without misperceptions, employees with similar 
impairments will be accurately perceived, and will in fact be “similarly situated,” not only in 
terms of their physical impairments, but also in terms of the treatment they should receive from 
their employer. 
 
                                                 
81 See McFarlin, supra note 4, at 964 (explaining employer culpability). 
82 In this situation, the employee would not be disabled within the meaning of the statute. 
83 422 F.3d 1220, 1239(11th Cir. 2005).  See also Williams, 380 F.3d at 775-776 (offering similar rejection of 
windfall theory); McFarlin, supra note 4, at 975-76 (explaining that such employees are often not similarly situated). 
84 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1239. 
85 Id. (quoting Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)). 
86 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1239; Williams, 380 F.3d at 775. 
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V. A RELATIONSHIP THEORY OF ACCOMMODATION FOR PERCEIVED DISABILITIES 
Both categorical approaches fail to appreciate the full range of factual situations that can 
arise under the regarded as disabled prong of the ADA.  Accommodation should be recognized 
to the extent necessary to give regarded as individuals equal opportunity to succeed,87 but 
accommodation should not be imposed on an employer when it would give an unfair advantage 
to the regarded as plaintiff. 
Neither categorical approach reaches the appropriate result in both of the introductory 
hypotheticals in Parts III and IV.  In the first hypothetical, the regarded as disabled plaintiff 
should not be entitled to reasonable accommodation, because it would result in an unfair 
advantage for that employee over a similarly situated individual.  In contrast, the regarded as 
disabled plaintiff in the second hypothetical should be entitled to reasonable accommodation, 
because accommodation is necessary to remedy the discriminatory effects of the employer’s 
misperception.  What is needed is a flexible theory that allows courts to require reasonable 
accommodations when necessary to provide equal opportunity and deny accommodation that 
would result in an unfair advantage or a windfall.88 
 For a flexible approach, courts should focus on the relationship between the disability and 
the accommodation.  For all disabilities, the reasonable accommodation obligation only applies 
                                                 
87 See McFarlin, supra note 4, at 976 (arguing in favor of accommodation). 
88 Two recent law review articles also offer alternative approaches, neither of which is fully satisfactory.  Professor 
Michelle Travis suggests that the issue of reasonable accommodation for perceived disabilities should be considered 
at the remedies stage of the inquiry.  See Travis, supra note 4, at 999-1010 (offering this as a “middle-ground 
proposal”).  This approach is flexible and leads to a result that offers equal opportunity without unfair advantage.  
However, by moving the accommodation issue to the remedy stage, it unnecessarily alters established jurisprudence 
under the ADA, which considers accommodation at the liability stage.  Michael Moberly also offers an alternative 
approach in his student note.  See Moberley, supra note 4, at 610.  His approach, which relies on the EEOC 
categories, would deny accommodation to individuals with a Category 2 or 3 perceived disability, but require 
accommodation for individuals with a Category 1 perceived disability.  Id.  This theory is unsatisfactory because it 
is no less categorical than the all-or-nothing approaches.  In addition, not all perceived disabilities will fit neatly into 
one of the three categories.  See infra note 93. 
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to accommodations that are related to a person’s disability.89  Accommodation must be 
appropriate to the individual situation in order to be effective.90  Because every disability is 
different and places different barriers on the individual, any accommodation must be directly 
related to helping the individual overcome his or her specific disability.91  For example, a reader 
might be a reasonable accommodation for a blind employee, but would never be a reasonable 
accommodation for an employee in a wheelchair.  This “relationship principle” should be applied 
to accommodation for perceived disabilities. 
 When an individual is regarded as disabled, the person’s disability includes, by 
definition, the misperception or discriminatory attitude of the employer.  Under a relationship 
principle, the reasonable accommodation must relate to this erroneous or discriminatory 
perception of the plaintiff’s condition, just as the accommodation for the individual who is 
actually disabled must relate to the impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.  For 
example, in the case of a plaintiff who has an impairment that is substantially limiting only 
because of the attitude of others, the accommodation must relate to removing the barriers put in 
place by these discriminatory attitudes.  This requires courts to take a flexible approach to the 
reasonable accommodation process.92 
 The remainder of this section applies the relationship principle to the EEOC’s three 
subcategories within the regarded as disabled prong and demonstrates the flexibility of the 
                                                 
89 Under the ADA, discrimination includes “not making reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.”  42 U.S.C. § 12111(b)(5)(A)(2000).  Implicit in 
this language is the requirement that the accommodation relate to the specific physical or mental limitation.  Accord 
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002)(explaining that the word “accommodation” conveys the 
need for “effectiveness” in removing the barrier of the limitation). 
90 See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400. 
91 See Vande Zande v. Wisc. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 541 (7th Cir. 1995)(“An unrelated, inefficacious change 
would not be an accommodation of the disability at all). 
92 See Travis, supra note 4, at 999 (arguing for more flexibility in accommodations). 
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relationship approach.  The categories are discussed in reverse order due to increasing analytical 
complexity.93 
A. CATEGORY 3:  WOULD ACCOMMODATION EVER BE REASONABLE? 
 An individual with a Category 3 perceived disability “[has no impairment] but is treated 
by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.”94  The EEOC example is an 
employee who is fired because of an unfounded rumor that he has HIV.95  
 For this individual, the employer’s misperception constitutes the entire disability.  Simply 
removing the misperception would almost always be sufficient to provide this individual with 
equal opportunity.  Here, the analogy to Title VII is the strongest.  The employee has a right to 
be treated equally and should be considered equal, similar to a victim of race or sex 
discrimination.  Just as race is not a legitimate consideration in an employment decision, neither 
is an erroneous perception of an impairment that does not exist. 
 Because simply removing the misperception would probably provide this individual with 
equal opportunity, it is unlikely that this individual would ever be entitled to additional 
accommodation.  Physical accommodation would never be required, because the disability does 
not include an element of physical impairment.  Physical accommodation would therefore not 
directly relate to this specific disability.  But, in a rare case, a Category 3 individual may be 
entitled to accommodations that eliminate discriminatory social barriers in the work 
environment.  If there were lingering discriminatory effects of the employer’s misperception that 
were not corrected merely by removing that misperception, then the individual might be entitled 
                                                 
93 Because not all perceived disabilities will fit neatly into one of the categories, a rigid adherence to the categories 
would be artificial.  See ROBERT L. BURGDORF, JR., DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 154 
(1995)(stating that the categories can “overcomplicate” the issues).  The categories are, however, helpful for this 
analysis because each category presents a different conceptual issue. 
94 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(l)(1). 
95 Id. 
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to an accommodation that would remove barriers caused by such effects.  For example, if 
coworkers ostracized the employee because of an unfounded rumor of HIV, and if the 
employer’s misperception had a role in furthering that rumor, then a reasonable accommodation 
might include an effort by the employer to correct the misperception of coworkers.  This type of 
social accommodation would have a direct relationship to the misperception that was the cause 
of the disability in the first place. 
B. CATEGORY 2:  ACCOMMODATION IN RESPONSE TO DISCRIMINATORY ATTITUDES 
An individual with a Category 2 perceived disability “[h]as a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others 
toward such impairment.” 96  For this individual, by definition, the disability is solely the 
stereotyping that results from the perceptions of others.   
Under a relationship principle, any accommodation would therefore have to relate to 
overcoming this stereotype.  Like a Category 3 employee, such an individual would not be 
entitled to a physical accommodation, because a physical accommodation would not be related to 
the stereotype that is the cause of the disability.  A Category 2 plaintiff, however, may also be 
entitled to accommodations that eliminate discriminatory social barriers in the work 
environment.97  Such accommodation could include additional education or sensitivity training 
for supervisors or coworkers.98 
                                                 
96 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(l)(3). 
97 See Travis, supra note 4, at 999 (making similar argument in favor of social accommodation to overcome 
limitations caused by attitudes of others). 
98 Id.  This type of social accommodation in response to discriminatory attitudes is related to a potential hostile work 
environment claim under the ADA.  The ADA does not specifically provide for hostile work environment claim, but 
lower courts have “either assumed or expressly acknowledged that [such as claim] may be brought under the ADA.”  
ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 60, at 806.  See also, e.g., Shaver v. Independent Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 
2003); Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Serv. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 232-33 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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C. CATEGORY 1:  THE DOUBLE IMPACT OF IMPAIRMENT AND ATTITUDE 
 1. The Test.  An individual with a Category 1 perceived disability ‘[h]as a physical or 
mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a 
covered entity as constituting such limitation.” 99  For this individual, the disability is not merely 
the misperception.  The disability includes both an element of physical or mental impairment and 
an element of misperception by the employer.  Therefore, the appropriate accommodation must 
relate to both the physical or mental element and the misperception element of the disability.  
Under a relationship principle, this individual should not be entitled to a physical 
accommodation that relates only the physical impairment.  But the individual may be entitled to 
a physical accommodation of the physical impairment to the extent that it is also related to the 
misperception or discriminatory attitude of the employer. 
 This relationship approach can be captured by a basic disparate treatment test:  the 
individual should be entitled to the physical accommodation the employer would have provided 
but for the misperception or discriminatory attitude.  There are a variety of ways a plaintiff 
employee could create such an inference.  First, the plaintiff could show the treatment of 
similarly situated individuals who were not misperceived by the employer.  This could include 
evidence of the employer’s treatment of other employees with impairments that do not rise to the 
level of actual disabilities.  In the alternative, the plaintiff could present evidence of his or her 
own treatment before the employer’s misperception arose.  Second, under a disparate treatment 
model, the plaintiff could point to the employer’s failure to articulate a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for denying the accommodation or show that the employer’s proffered 
reason was pretextual. 
                                                 
99 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(l)(2). 
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 2. Analysis.  A wide range of impairments and misperceptions can arise under Category 1 
of perceived disabilities.   Often the employee will have a minor physical impairment and will be 
qualified without reasonable accommodation.100  This is the easy case.  Physical accommodation 
for such an individual is not necessary, because the employee can perform the essential functions 
of the job without it.  This employee needs a fair chance, not accommodation, to have equal 
opportunity for success.  Requiring the employer to provide an extra accommodation for such an 
employee would be a windfall that would lead to an unfair advantage. 
Courts and commentators who advocate a “nothing” rule often assume that the regarded 
as disabled class only includes individuals without serious impairments, referring to them as 
“merely” or “only” regarded as disabled.”101  This is not always correct.  This assumption 
oversimplifies the potential fact issues that can arise under the regarded as prong.102  A physical 
impairment is often practically limiting, imposing serious obstacles to equal opportunity in the 
workplace, even where the impairment is not substantially limiting enough to be an “actual 
disability” under the ADA.103  The Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, 
Inc.,104 holding that mitigation should be considered in determining whether an impairment is 
substantially limiting, may expand this potential class of Category 1 plaintiffs.  By considering 
mitigation, Sutton raises the bar for showing an actual disability.  This could increase the number 
                                                 
100 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (giving EEOC example of Category 1). 
101 See e.g., Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916 (8th Cir. 1999)(describing plaintiffs as “non-disabled 
employees who are simply regarded as disabled”); Dudley, supra note 4, at 415-16 (referring to employees who are 
“merely ‘regarded as’ disabled,” and stating that there is “not any actual impairment that negatively affects job 
performance”). 
102 These courts often reach the correct result based on the facts of the cases before them, but their categorical rule 
does not consider the full range of plaintiffs that may be entitled to protection under the ADA. 
103 See D’Angelo v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2005)(summarized at infra notes 109-112 and 
accompanying text); Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc., 410 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2005)(summarized at infra notes 114-
117 and accompanying text). 
104 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). 
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of individuals with practically limiting impairments that are more likely to bring claims under the 
regarded as prong.105 
Courts taking the nothing approach also assume that employers are not willing to provide 
accommodation to workers unless it is mandated by the ADA.  This is, of course, also a false 
assumption.  Many times an employer will provide accommodation to employees because it 
makes good business sense.  The nothing approach assumes that an employee with nondisabling 
impairments will not be accommodated.  These courts then reason that if such an employee was 
misperceived as disabled, it would be a “windfall” or an “unfair advantage” for that employee to 
receive any accommodation.  More likely, however, many employers are willing to provide 
simple and costless accommodations as a common employment practice, but are less willing to 
provide more substantial or costly accommodations unless mandated by the ADA. 
In many cases, a Category 1 employee’s impairment will interfere with the employee’s 
ability to perform the essential functions of the job even though the impairment is not 
substantially limiting enough to constitute an actual disability.  Such an employee may not be 
qualified for the job without some accommodation for the nondisabling but physically limiting 
impairment.106  This is the tougher case.  For such a claim, courts should follow a disparate 
treatment model.  The issue is whether the adverse employment action was taken because the 
employer had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not providing the accommodation, such 
as the cost of the accommodation, or whether the accommodation was not provided because of a 
misperception or discriminatory intent.107  Under this test, the employer would not be required to 
                                                 
105 See Kelly, 410 F.3d at 670 (summarized at infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text). 
106 Id. 
107 It is important to keep the relationship test separate from the test which defines the perceived disability.  The test 
for a regarded as disability is not whether the defendant has treated the plaintiff adversely because of his or her 
impairment; instead, the test is whether the defendant regards plaintiff as having an impairment that substantially 
limits a major life activity.  Under the relationship approach to accommodation, the plaintiff would need show that 
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accommodate such an employee unless the failure to accommodate was because of 
misperception or discriminatory intent. 
 3. Application.  The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits recently held that employees with 
perceived disabilities are entitled to reasonable accommodation.108  Under the relationship 
approach, the outcome in these two cases were appropriate for those specific plaintiffs, even 
though both courts erred by adopting the overinclusive all approach to accommodation. 
 In D’Angelo v. Conagra Foods, Inc., the plaintiff employee was diagnosed with vertigo 
prior to accepting her job at a seafood processing plant.109  She never filled her prescription 
because her symptoms subsided.  At work, she experienced dizziness when she was assigned to 
monitor a moving conveyor belt.  She told her supervisor, who assigned her to other jobs on the 
production line where she was near the moving belt but not required to stare directly at it.  
Despite her impairment, she was able to perform almost all of the jobs on the line, because only a 
few of the jobs involved monitoring moving belts.  She continued to work and was promoted 
twice in three years.110 
She was then transferred to a new division, and her new supervisor assigned her to 
monitor the “box-former belt.”111  Again, she experienced symptoms of vertigo, and she told her 
new supervisor about the dizziness.  The supervisor asked her for medical documentation of her 
condition, and she brought a copy of her unused prescription and a doctor’s note that said she 
should not look at moving belts.  Without engaging in an interactive process with the plaintiff, 
                                                                                                                                                             
he was regarded as disabled and that he was denied physical accommodation because of the defendant’s attitude 
towards this perceived disability. 
108 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1240; Kelly, 410 F.3d at 676.   
109 D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1222-24. 
110 Id. at 1222. 
111 Id. at 1223. 
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the employer misinterpreted the doctor’s note to mean that she could not be around any moving 
equipment at all.  Then, they fired her because they had no such positions.112 
Under the relationship approach, this plaintiff employee should be entitled to the same 
accommodation she would have received but for the misperception of the employer.  The 
misperception arose three years after she began working for the defendant; therefore, she has 
evidence that the employer would have accommodated her impairment had she not been 
misperceived.  The ADA should entitle her to this level of accommodation in order to provide 
her with equal opportunity. 
This interpretation is consistent with general antidiscrimination law.  Under Title VII and 
the ADA, a benefit that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be doled out in 
a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free under the employment contract 
simply not to provide the benefit at all.113  Without the misperception in the D’Angelo case, the 
employer would not have been required to accommodate her vertigo.  But once the employer 
makes a common practice of offering an accommodation for a minor physical impairment, the 
employer is not entitled to deny that accommodation to another employee because of a 
characteristic that is protected by statute, in this case a misperception of the employee’s 
impairment. 
In Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc.,114 the plaintiff employee worked as a receptionist for the 
defendant employer.  After four years of work, she had a pulmonary embolism that required her 
to miss two weeks of work.  After her hospitalization, she had trouble breathing, and her doctor 
advised that she needed to use supplemental oxygen while at work.  The employer would not 
                                                 
112 Id. at 1223-24. 
113 See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75-76 (1984)(applying Title VII to incidents of the employment 
relationship); 29 C.F.R. 1630.4(f)(discussing discrimination in benefits under ADA).  
114 410 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2005). 
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allow her to bring the oxygen into the workplace, and she was fired when she was unable to 
return without it.115  The District Court held that she was not actually disabled, because her 
breathing impairment could be mitigated by the use of portable oxygen.116  The Tenth Circuit 
held that she was entitled to the reasonable accommodation of being allowed to bring her own 
oxygen to work.117 
Under a relationship approach, this plaintiff would only be entitled to the accommodation 
that she would have received but for the discriminatory attitude of her employer.  This would 
depend on whether the employer could articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for denying 
accommodation, and whether the employee could show that the articulated reason was 
pretextual.  The facts in the opinion are insufficient to make this determination, but they strongly 
favor the employee.  The employer would have no cost justification for denying the 
accommodation, because the employee was merely requesting permission to supply her own 
oxygen.  The employer’s stated reason for her dismissal in a termination letter was paternalistic 
concern for the employee’s own health.118  Even though this type of direct threat defense, based 
on risk to the employee’s own health, can be cognizable under the ADA, legislative history 
advises that such a defense is likely pretextual.119 
 Although the Tenth Circuit in Kelly adopted the categorical all approach for 
accommodation of perceived disabilities, the reasoning in the opinion mirrors the relationship 
approach advanced by this Paper.  The court stated,  
“[A]n employer who is unable or unwilling to shed his or her stereotypic 
assumptions based on a faulty or prejudiced perception of an employee's abilities 
                                                 
115 Id. at 672-73. 
116 Id. at 673. 
117 Id. at 676. 
118 Id. at 673. 
119 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 n.5 (2002)(citing legislative history). 
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must be prepared to accommodate the artificial limitations created by his or her 
own faulty perceptions. In this sense, the ADA encourages employers to become 
more enlightened about their employees' capabilities, while protecting employees 
from employers whose attitudes remain mired in prejudice.”120 
Following this logic and the relationship approach, an employer can deny physical 
accommodations for perceived disabilities for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, such as 
cost.  However, an employer cannot deny physical accommodation solely because of stereotypic 
assumptions, prejudice, or a misperception of the employee’s impairment. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 In considering whether individuals with perceived disabilities are entitled to reasonable 
accommodation, the circuit courts have split over two categorical approaches.  Courts in favor of 
accommodation have held that accommodation is consistent with the plain language and 
congressional purpose of the ADA.  Other courts have denied accommodation because of 
concerns that it will result in an unfair advantage over similarly situated individuals.  Both of 
these categorical approaches fail to reach the appropriate results for the full range of fact 
situations that can arise under the regarded as disabled prong of the ADA. 
 Courts should adopt a more flexible approach that focuses on the relationship between 
the accommodation and the specific regarded as disability.  Where the perceived impairment 
involves the attitudes of others, reasonable accommodation should relate to overcoming the 
barriers imposed by the effects of the stereotype.  Where the perceived disability includes both 
an element of physical impairment and an element of misperception or stereotype, then the 
reasonable accommodation should have a direct relationship to both the physical and social 
                                                 
120 Kelly, 410 F.3d at 676. 
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elements that comprise the disability.  Under this relationship approach, social accommodations 
should be required to overcome social barriers in the workplace, and physical accommodation 
should be required where such accommodation was only denied because of misperception or 
discriminatory attitude.  This alternative approach is the most faithful to the legislative purpose 
of the ADA, because it gives courts the flexibility to award accommodation that provides equal 
employment opportunity and deny accommodation that results in an unfair advantage. 
